Liberty Glossary

Glossary · Liberty

This pillar is about what the law calls things and how courts read them, so its vocabulary is legal vocabulary. Every entry below is a definition, an example quoted from a statute, a constitution or a Supreme Court opinion, and the near-miss term it is mixed up with. Nothing here is about acquiring, modifying or carrying anything; the entries classify and explain, dated as of 7 September 2026, and are not legal advice.

A to Z

“Assault weapon” (statutory term)

A term that exists only where a statute defines it, and means only what that statute lists. There has been no federal definition in force since 13 September 2004, when the 1994 law’s ten-year term expired; each state that uses the phrase writes its own list, and several use a different phrase altogether.

Worked example California defines “assault weapon” at Penal Code § 30510; New Jersey’s term is “assault firearm” (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w)); Massachusetts uses “assault-style firearm” (ch. 140, § 121); Colorado’s 2025 act defines a “specified semiautomatic firearm” (C.R.S. § 18-12-116). Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Arizona and Georgia have no such term in their chapters’ definitions sections. The state reference quotes each definition’s opening clause.

Commonly confused with: “Assault rifle”, a technical description of a select-fire military weapon, which the AR-15 piece separates from the statutory term; and “AR-15”, a product name.

Read next: State-by-State Firearm Law Reference Assault Rifle vs. AR-15

Incorporation doctrine

The line of cases holding that most guarantees in the Bill of Rights bind the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not only the federal government. Whether a given right is “incorporated” decides whether a state statute can be challenged under it at all.

Worked example The question presented in Viramontes v. Cook County (No. 25-238), which the Supreme Court agreed to hear on 30 June 2026 and set for argument on 2 December 2026, is framed in incorporation terms: “Whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.” The Fourteenth is in the sentence because Cook County is not the federal government.

Commonly confused with: The Privileges or Immunities Clause route to the same result, which the Court has mostly declined to use, and “selective” versus “total” incorporation, which is the historical debate about how many rights come along.

Read next: State reference: What’s Still Unsettled

NFA item

Anything that falls within the definition of “firearm” in the National Firearms Act of 1934 — a narrower, tax-and-registration category than the ordinary word — and is therefore subject to that act’s registration scheme.

Worked example The definition at 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) opens: “The term ‘firearm’ means (1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length…” and continues through several enumerated categories; § 5845(b) defines “machinegun” as a weapon that shoots “automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” Civilian ownership of machine guns made after 19 May 1986 cannot be newly registered, as the AR-15 piece explains.

Commonly confused with: The ordinary meaning of “firearm” in 18 U.S.C. § 921, which is far broader. An ordinary rifle is a firearm under Title 18 and not a “firearm” under the NFA.

Read next: State reference: the federal baseline

Preemption

A statute by which a state reserves firearms regulation to itself and displaces local ordinances. The reference table classifies a preemption statute as full (the state occupies the field with no carve-outs), partial (the statute lists what localities keep) or inverted (localities may go stricter, not looser).

Worked example Pennsylvania’s is full: “No county, municipality or township may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of firearms…” (18 Pa.C.S. § 6120(a)). California’s is partial — Gov. Code § 53071 occupies only “the whole field of regulation of the registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms.” Colorado’s runs the other way since 2021: a local government “may enact an ordinance… governing or prohibiting the sale, purchase, transfer, or possession of a firearm” (C.R.S. § 29-11.7-103).

Commonly confused with: Federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause, which is a different doctrine with the same name, and home rule, which is the local power preemption limits.

Read next: State-by-State Firearm Law Reference

Prohibited person

Someone federal law bars from possessing a firearm, by category, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — the section that lists the disqualifying statuses. Which categories survive Second Amendment review is the subject of current litigation.

Worked example United States v. Hemani, decided 18 June 2026, concerned the § 922(g)(3) category — an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court for a seven-Justice majority; Thomas, Jackson (joined by Sotomayor) and Alito (joined by Kagan, concurring in the judgment) wrote separately. The reference page records the line-up from the syllabus.

Commonly confused with: A state-level disqualification, which can be broader than the federal list, and a conviction that is later expunged or pardoned, which the statute treats separately.

Read next: State reference: What’s Still Unsettled

Shall-issue / may-issue / permitless

Three classifications of a public-carry licence statute, read from the statute’s own operative verb: “shall issue” on objective criteria; “may issue” at the authority’s discretion; or no licence required for a qualifying adult, which the reference calls permitless and the press calls constitutional carry.

Worked example Colorado: “a sheriff shall issue a permit to carry a concealed handgun to an applicant who:” (C.R.S. § 18-12-203(1)). Ohio: “A person who is a qualifying adult shall not be required to obtain a concealed handgun license in order to carry in this state” (Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.111(B)(1)). Connecticut’s statute says “may issue” (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28), so the reference applies no shall-issue label to it.

Commonly confused with: Reciprocity (whether one state honours another’s licence) and eligibility rules — neither is recorded on this site; the classification is the statute’s face, nothing more.

Read next: State-by-State Firearm Law Reference

State constitutional arms provision

A clause in a state’s own constitution protecting a right to keep or bear arms, in that state’s words. It is independent of the Second Amendment: a state court can read its own clause more broadly, and a state without one relies on the federal right alone.

Worked example Pennsylvania, art. I, § 21: “The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.” Ohio, art. I, § 4 (effective 1 September 1851): “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security…” Colorado, art. II, § 13, protects the right “in defense of his home, person and property” and adds that nothing in it justifies carrying concealed weapons. California’s Declaration of Rights, read in full from the Legislature’s site, contains no such clause.

Commonly confused with: The Second Amendment, and the widely repeated count of how many states lack such a clause — the reference verified the absence for California and New York only and does not publish a number.

Read next: State-by-State Firearm Law Reference

Strict scrutiny

The most demanding tier of constitutional review: a law survives only if it serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to it. For decades courts sorted rights into tiers of scrutiny; for the Second Amendment, Bruen replaced the tiers with a different test.

Worked example After New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the courts of appeals no longer weigh a state “assault weapon” statute against a compelling interest; they ask whether it is consistent with the Second Amendment as Bruen reads it — the question the en banc Third Circuit answered on 17 July 2026 when it held that “New Jersey’s complete prohibition on the possession of semi-automatic rifles runs afoul of the Second Amendment’s protections,” splitting from the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits.

Commonly confused with: Intermediate scrutiny (an important interest, substantially related) and rational-basis review (any legitimate interest), the two lower tiers; and “means-end scrutiny” generally, which is the whole tiered approach Bruen set aside for this right.

Read next: State reference: What’s Still Unsettled

“What’s still unsettled”

The site’s convention for writing about live law: a dated closing section that names what no court has finally decided, so a piece stays accurate when the ruling lands because it never claimed to know. It is the sanctioned form for unresolved questions, and the reason no Liberty piece is built around a case’s current status.

Worked example As of 7 September 2026 the reference lists six items, among them: Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins, granted 30 June 2026, set for argument 2 December 2026, undecided; Duncan v. Bonta, a magazine-capacity petition distributed for conference repeatedly since November 2025 without action; and Virginia’s SB 749, signed May 2026, effective 1 July 2026 and enjoined before that date in Crump v. Katz. Wolford v. Lopez (decided 25 June 2026, 6–3) and Hemani are listed as decided.

Commonly confused with: A litigation tracker, which is what this site does not run — a tracker needs updating to stay true; an unsettled-section names the open question and dates the claim.

Read next: State reference: What’s Still Unsettled How we work

Terms used across the guide: the Liberty Guide. Every figure on this page was read on 7 September 2026; the reference pages it cites are updated in place.

Article sources

1. Bills & Beans, State-by-State Firearm Law Reference — every statute, constitution and docket quoted above, with URLs, HTTP status by fetch method, and read dates.
2. Cornell Legal Information Institute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845 and 18 U.S.C. § 921 (editorial notes on the 1994 sunset).
3. Supreme Court of the United States, question presented, No. 25-238; slip opinions in Wolford v. Lopez and United States v. Hemani as cited in the reference.
4. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Nos. 24-2415, 24-2450 & 24-2506 (en banc, 17 July 2026).
5. State codes and constitutions as cited in the reference: California (leginfo.legislature.ca.gov), Ohio (codes.ohio.gov), Pennsylvania and Colorado (Justia / FindLaw text of the statute).